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“delinquent contributions and shifting of assets to avoid having to pay workers.”4 Canal Asphalt,
the defendant-debtor, filed a voluntary petition for chapter 11 relief in the Southern District of
New York. Thus, the cause of action was automatically stayed against the debtor, pursuant to
section 362(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code.5 The other defendants argued in a letter to the District
Court of the Eastern District of New York that because the non-debtor corporations are alter egos
of one another, the automatic stay arising in the debtor’s case should prevent the action from
proceeding against all defendants.6 The District Court disagreed and instead, issued an order
stating that the automatic stay only enjoined actions against debtors or their property.7
I.

Background of Section 362(a)(1)
Under 11 U.S.C. §362(a)(1), “a petition filed [for voluntary bankruptcy]…operates as a

stay, applicable to all entitles, of the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or
employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the
debtor…or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case
under this title.”8 The stay is triggered when “a petition is filed under section 301, 302 or 303, or
when an application is filed under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of
1970.”9
“The legislative history of the provision reveals that Congress enacted §362 to provide
protection for bankrupt debtors and to facilitate the orderly distribution of debtors' assets among

4

See id. at *1, 4.
11 U.S.C. §362(a)(1); See Pavers & Road Builders District Council Welfare Fund v. Core
Contracting of NY, LLC, 2015 WL 4925351, at *1.
6
See id.
7
See id.
8
11 U.S.C. §362(a)(1) (emphasis added).
9
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 362.03, p. 1 (15th 2015).
5
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their creditors.”10 Thus, its purpose is to provide “the debtor with relief from the pressure and
harassment of creditors seeking to collect their claims.”11 This purpose works to promote
bankruptcy’s overarching goal of “equality of distribution.”12
To achieve the goal of “equality of distribution” the drafters made the scope of section
362(a)(1) broad. The section covers “all types of legal proceedings” and is subject only to
limited exceptions found in section 362(b).13 However, the broad scope of the stay has
traditionally been interpreted to apply only to the debtor. Therefore, “[t]he stay of litigation does
not protect non-debtor parties who may be subjected to litigation for transactions or events
involving the debtor.”14
II.

When Does an Automatic Stay Apply to Non-Debtors?
A. Existing Relationship between Debtor and Non-Debtor
Courts can apply a fact-specific analysis to determine whether the section 362 stay

applies to non-debtors as well as debtors. For example, in cases involving general partnerships,
courts have relied on the facts that partners can be held jointly and severally liable for their

10

Credit Alliance Corp. v. Williams, 851 F.2d 119 (4th Cir. 1988).
Id. Providing the debtor with this stay allows them to retain their property and assets “that may
be necessary for the debtor’s fresh start” and “provides breathing space to permit the debtor to
focus on rehabilitation.” Id.
12
Id. See also H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 340 (1977):
The automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor protections provided by the
bankruptcy laws. It gives the debtor a breathing spell from his creditors. It stops all
collection efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure actions. It permits the debtor to
attempt a repayment or reorganization plan, or simply to be relieved of the financial
pressures that drove him into bankruptcy.
Id.
13
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 362.03[3], p. 2 (15th 2015) (“[The stay] even covers actions or
proceedings against when the debtor acts solely in a fiduciary capacity…[and] proceedings on
both dischargeable and non-dischargeable debt.”).
14
Id. (“[A] suit against a codefendant is not automatically stayed by the debtor’s bankruptcy
filing.”).
11
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individual actions.15 Therefore, the court will determine whether the action proceeding against
the partner arose out of the partner acting in an individual capacity. For example, the court in
Patton v. Bearden held that the automatic stay does not protect a partner of a partnership.16 On
the other hand, courts have determined that it is appropriate, in some cases, to extend the
automatic stay to debtor’s insurers because those insurance policies are part of the debtor’s
estate.17
Furthermore, the court in Credit Alliance Corp v. Williams looked to the intent of
Congress in drafting the automatic stay provision and determined that to apply the stay to
guarantors would negate Congress’ intentions for the Bankruptcy Code.18 The court held
“[n]othing in § 362 suggests that Congress intended that provision to strip from the creditors of a
bankrupt debtor the protection they sought and received when they required a third party to

15

See Credit Alliance Corp v. Williams, 8 F.3d 343, 346 (6th Cir.1993).
Credit Alliance Corp v. Williams, 8 F.3d at 346. The court reasoned “a partnership may file a
petition in bankruptcy even though its partners have not.” Id. at 349. Therefore, because the
partner is not a debtor and can be held jointly and severally liable, the partner is responsible for
individual actions against him. Id. The stay does not apply. Id. This same reasoning applies to
corporate shareholders. An action may be brought against the corporate shareholders of a
corporation, despite the applicability of a stay to the corporation. Collier on Bankruptcy
362.03[3], p. 5 (15th 2015).
17
See MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 837 F.2d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 868, 109 S. Ct. 176, 102 L. Ed. 2d 145 (1988). Under certain circumstances, courts will
apply the automatic stay to an action against a debtor’s insurers. Collier on Bankruptcy
362.03[3], p. 5 (15th 2015). If the court finds that the debtor’s insurance policies are property of
the estate, the court will stay the action to recover on those policies. Id. For example, in
MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp., the court found “that [the] insurance policies and their
proceeds were ‘substantial property of the [] estate which will be diminished if and to the extent
that third party direct actions against the insurance carriers result in plaintiffs' judgments.’” 837
F.2d at 92 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing Johns-Manville Corp., 26 B.R. 420, 435 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1983)).
18
851 F.2d 119, 121 (4th Cir. 1988) (“A reading of § 362 restricting a creditor's ability to
proceed against its guarantor would eliminate the protection of assured creditors contemplated by
the Bankruptcy Code.”)
16
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guaranty the debt,” and therefore the automatic stay does not apply to guarantors under section
362.19
B. Identity of Interest
Aside from analyzing the nature of the relationship between debtor and non-debtor,
whether it is a partnership or insurance relationship, courts will also analyze the closeness of the
relationship between debtor and non-debtor.20 Courts have held that in “unusual circumstances,”
like when the debtor and non-debtor’s interests are very closely related, the automatic stay can
extend to the non-debtor party.21 Therefore, the non-debtor must prove that its interests are so
closely related to the debtor party’s by demonstrating that “there is such identity between the
debtor and the non-debtor that the debtor may be said to be the real party defendant and that a
judgment against the non-debtor will in effect be a judgment or findings against the debtor.”22
The court in A.H. Robins Co. attempted to define what “unusual circumstances” were
sufficient for a court to find an identity of interest.23 However, the only guidance the court

19

Id.
See In re Divine Ripe, L.L.C., 538 B.R. 300, 302 (Bankr. S.D.Tex. 2015). “Courts recognize
that a § 362 stay may apply to an action against non-debtor defendants depending on their
relationship to the debtor.” See also A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 999 (4th Cir.
1986) (“[A] bankruptcy court may invoke § 362 to stay proceedings against nonbankrupt
codefendants where ‘there is such an identity between the debtor and the third-party defendant
that the debtor may be said to be the real party defendant and that a judgment against the thirdparty defendant will in effect be a judgment or finding against the debtor.’”).
21
See In re Union Trust Philadelphia, LLC, 465 B.R. 765, 770 (Bankr. E.D.Penn. 2011).
“Unusual circumstances exist when ‘there is such identity between the debtor and third-party
defendant that the debtor may be said to be the real party defendant and that a judgment against
the third party defendant will in effect be a judgment or finding against the debtor.’” Id.; see also
In re Bidermann Industries U.S.A., Inc., 200 B.R. 779 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“The case law
indicates that ‘unusual circumstances' exist where the claim clearly arises out of the defendant's
actions in his capacity as the debtor's officer, and he is undisputedly entitled to indemnity.”)
22
In re Xenon Anesthesia of Texas, PLLC, 510 B.R. 106, 111–12 (Bankr.S.D.Tex.2014). “The
burden of proof to show that the automatic stay is applicable to a non-debtor is on the party
invoking the stay.” Id. at 111.
23
See 788 F.2d at 999.
20
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provided was that the relationship between the debtor and non-debtor must be “something more
than the mere fact that one of the parties to the lawsuit has filed [for bankruptcy].”24 For
example, “a suit against a third-party who is entitled to absolute indemnity by the debtor on
account of any judgment that might result against them in the case” would constitute a
relationship between debtor and non-debtor where the court could find an identity of interest. 25
III.

Applying the Automatic Stay to Non-Debtor In Addition to the Debtor under Pavers
& Road Builders District Council Welfare Fund
The court in Pavers & Road Builders District Council Welfare Fund developed a two-tier

analysis to determine whether the section 362 stay should apply to non-debtor parties. First, a
court should determine whether the debtor and non-debtor corporations are alter egos. If the
corporations are alter egos, the bankruptcy court must then determine if their interests are so
intertwined that the automatic stay must also apply to the non-debtor corporations.
In developing this two-step analysis the court held that it is no longer enough for
corporations to be alter egos. In other words, the court will no longer apply the stay solely
because corporations are alter egos, the corporations’ interests must also be comingled, such that
the stay would not protect the debtor unless it also applied to the non-debtor.
A. Alter Ego Status
For a court to consider two corporations “alter egos” of each other, they must
demonstrate a relationship that is more than “mere majority or complete stock control.”26
Corporations are only granted alter ego status upon a showing that one company “totally
dominates and controls” the other.27
24

Id.
Id.
26
U.S. v. Jon–T Chemicals, Inc. 768 F.2d 686, 691 (5th Cir. 1985).
27
Id. The court has determined a “laundry list of factors” that help to determine whether
corporations are alter egos.
25
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The bankruptcy court in In re Adler28 expanded upon the holding in Queenie, Ltd. v.
Nygard Int’l,29 which stated that “when a claim against the non-debtor will have an immediate
adverse economic consequence for the debtor's estate,” the automatic stay applies to alter egos.30
The In re Adler court held:
[I]f two judicial determinations have been made—(1) one or more non-debtor
corporations has been found liable for a prepetition debt on a cause of action
asserted in a post-petition proceeding, and (2) the veil between these corporate
alter egos and the non-party debtor has been pierced—the § 362(a)(1) stay was
violated by the post-petition proceeding.31
Therefore, under this holding, if a non-debtor is liable for debt but that non-debtor is the alter ego
of the debtor corporation, the automatic stay extends to the non-debtor.
It is important to note though that the court in Pavers & Road Builders District Council
Welfare Fund held that a corporate defendant’s status as an alter ego was not enough to
intermingle debtor and non-debtor interests, such that the automatic stay would be applied to the

(1) the parent and the subsidiary have common stock ownership; (2) the parent
and the subsidiary have common directors or officers; (3) the parent and the
subsidiary have common business departments; (4) the parent and the subsidiary
file consolidated financial statements and tax returns; (5) the parent finances the
subsidiary; (6) the parent caused the incorporation of the subsidiary; (7) the
subsidiary operates with grossly inadequate capital; (8) the parent pays the
salaries and other expenses of the subsidiary; (9) the subsidiary receives no
business except that given to it by the parent; (10) the parent uses the subsidiary's
property as its own; (11) the daily operations of the two corporations are not kept
separate; and (12) the subsidiary does not observe the basic corporate formalities,
such as keeping separate books and records and holding shareholder and board
meetings.
Id. at 691-692.
28
494 B.R. 43 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2013).
29
321 F.3d 282 (2d Cir. 2003).
30
Id. at 287 (citing A.H. Robins Co., Inc. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 999 (4th Cir. 1986)).
31
494 B.R. at 281.
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non-debtor.32 The court pointed out, “[j]ust because two entities are alter egos does not make
them both debtors under the Bankruptcy Code.”33
B. Intertwined Interests
The Pavers & Road Builders District Council Welfare Fund court concluded the debtor
could make a motion to the bankruptcy court to enjoin a district court from proceeding in the
action against the non-debtor on the grounds that it would “prejudice other creditors of the debtor
in a way that the Bankruptcy Court would consider unfair.”34 Under this approach, the
Bankruptcy Court would have discretion as to whether to grant the motion.35 If the Bankruptcy
Court does not issue an injunction, however, the district court could resolve the pending
litigation against the non-debtor.36
Under Pavers & Road Builders District Council Welfare Fund a bankruptcy court will
issue an injunction if it “is necessary to protect the debtor's estate or to effectuate its
reorganization.”37 Therefore, extending the stay to non-debtors should only be done in cases
where it serves to protect the debtor.38 For example, “it may be necessary to extend the automatic
stay…to protect the non-debtor entities, for not only may they be alter- egos, but they may be
holding the assets that should be used to satisfy all of the debtor’s creditors.”39

32

See generally Pavers & Road Builders District Council Welfare Fund v. Core Contracting of
NY, LLC, 2015 WL 4925351, at *5.
33
Id. at *2.
34
See id. at *4.
35
See id.
36
See id.
37
Id. at *3. (“It is the protection of the debtor, not the non-debtors (who receive the benefit only
collaterally) that furnishes the rationale for extending the automatic stay to include those nondebtors”).
38
Pavers & Road Builders District Council Welfare Fund, 2015 WL 4925351, at *3.
39
Id.
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Therefore, “[w]hile an alter ego finding might make debtor and non-debtors liable for
each other [sic] debts, it did not make them all bankruptcy ‘debtors,’ and if the non-debtors
desired the protections of the automatic stay, they needed to file their own bankruptcy
petitions.”40 The court’s analysis must not end with a determination as to a corporation’s alter
ego status. Instead, the court must continue in its analysis to determine whether the interests of
the debtor and non-debtor corporations are so intertwined such that a refusal to apply the section
362 stay to non-debtor corporations will harm the debtor.
C. Similarities between Intertwined Interests and Identity of Interest
This language in Pavers & Road Builders District Council Welfare Fund, which requires
a stay to be issued if it is necessary to protect the debtor, mirrors the language found in A.H.
Robins Co., which also required the court to issue a stay to protect the debtor from judgment.
Both holdings work to achieve bankruptcy’s overarching goal of “equality of distribution” by
protecting the interest of the debtor. 41
IV.

The Lack of a Bright-Line Rule
The analysis that the court developed in Pavers & Road Builders District Council

Welfare Fund does not set a practical standard that can be applied in future cases. Instead, courts
are left to use their discretion as to whether they believe that the debtor and non-debtor interests
are so intertwined that the stay must apply to both parties.
Another recent case, In re Divine Ripe, L.L.C., also focuses on the discretion of the
court.42 The In re Divine Ripe court held that:
To extend the Automatic Stay to a non-debtor, a court must find an identity of
interest between the debtor and the non-debtor, and then evaluate whether the
40

Stay Did Not Protect Alleged Alter Egos, 09-23-15 West's Bankr. Newsl. 7
See supra n. 11 and accompanying text.
42
538 B.R. 300 (Bankr. S.D.Tex. 2015).
41
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circumstances warrant exercising the “general discretionary power ... to stay
proceedings in the interest of justice and in control of their dockets.43
This allows the court to exercise its discretion to refuse to apply the stay, even if it finds an
identity of interest.
These discretionary analyses will lead to more complex and costly litigation caused by a
lack of consistency in the application of the analysis to subsequent cases. Pavers & Road
Builders District Council Welfare Fund and In re Divine Ripe, L.L.C. leave non-debtors with a
precedent that can be applied discretionarily and does not provide these non-debtors with any
guidance on how to obtain stays absent filing a bankruptcy petition for relief as well.
Conclusion
Although the application of a section 362 stay to non-debtors is discretionary, one thing
is clear from the case law: stays will only be granted to non-debtors if it is in the best interest of
the debtor. From earlier cases, such as A.H. Robins Co., we saw that the court’s primary focus is
to protect debtors from falling victim to the judgments of their non-debtor co-defendants. This
agenda is carried out even in later cases. And as we saw in Pavers & Road Builders District
Council Welfare Fund, even corporations that are alter-egos of one another will endure scrutiny
by the court to ensure that stays are only extended to the non-debtor when it is required to protect
the interests of the debtor corporation.
Therefore, even though the applicability of section 362 stays are discretionary, if an
argument can be made that extending the stay would serve to protect the debtor in some way, the
stay may be granted.

43

Id. at 309 (citing Wedgeworth v. Fibreboard Corp., 706 F.2d 541, 545 (5th Cir. 1983)).
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